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This article provides sociological reflections on the use of research methods in the 
history of sport. In light of the convergence of social scientific approaches and social research 
methods in recent years, it draws upon Durkheim’s reflections on the principles of sociology 
to explore the potential of the discipline to provide a distinctive methodological orientation to 
the study of sport. It subsequently uses this framework to assess the tendency in sports history 
to present interview data in non-anonymized form, and to advocate the value of particular 
kinds of comparative analysis for forwarding our understanding of the social world. 
A formative moment in the development of sociology was the 1895 publication of 
Emile Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method. 1  For Durkheim, the discipline’s 
viability depended upon the identification of a distinct object of study, requiring a distinct 
method of investigation. He embarked on a search for ‘social facts’ characterized by three 
criteria: externality (valid beyond individual humans); constraint (the consequence of living 
with other humans); and generality/independence (the behavioural similarities and 
differences between social groups and contexts). In so doing, Durkheim sought the study of 
observable, unconscious mental entities or ‘collective representations’ in order to deliver ‘a 
conception of the world which as far as possible is not the view from anywhere within it’.2 
By this definition, sociological method must enable us to conceive of the social world at a 
relatively high level of generality.  
The formation of sociology occurred relative to the pre-existing natural sciences and 
disciplines such as psychology, philosophy and history. Durkheim dismissed psychology as 
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too individualistically oriented. Conversely he argued that the analytic scope of philosophy 
had the potential to provide ‘a complete systematisation of experiences’,3 but considered that 
detailed empiricism was required to go beyond its essentially abstract and speculative 
character. His view of history however was particularly equivocal. Highly critical of much 
historical work – ‘normally the historian perceives only the most superficial part of social 
life’4 – he professed that ‘I know of no sociology worthy of the name which does not possess 
a historical character’.5 Influenced by the approach (if not the thesis) of Marx, Durkheim 
identified the potential of sociology to counter the tendency in historical research to privilege 
accounts of individuals (motives and interpretations) and thus subsequently fail to reveal the 
broader structural dynamics of social change (for Marx, for example, class conflict).  
While aspiring to philosophy’s ambition and history’s positivist rigour, Durkheim 
believed that comparison would provide sociology’s unique methodology. Comparison could 
take three forms - intra-societal, inter-societal or cross-species – but the wider the scale of 
comparison the better: ‘What we [sociologists] must look for is a means of comparing 
historical data, and establish series of phenomena which vary along parallel lines’. 6 For 
example, Durkheim famously compared suicide rates in different societies in order to make 
more general claims about the structure of those particular societies.7 For Durkheim, ‘The 
comparative method is the sole one suitable for sociology’.8  
A century later the context is very different. Sociology has become a fractured 
discipline with, for instance, many sociologists working in business schools, sports science 
and, increasingly, health departments.9 Some perceive sociologists of sport to be facing a 
crisis due to specialization and scientization which has led to their positioning at the ‘bottom 
of the epistemological hierarchy’.10 Multidisciplinarity has been identified as a solution, and 
this movement has been aided by the widespread rejection of Durkheimian positivism, and its 
replacement with a stronger vein of interpretivism and qualitative methods.  
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It is perhaps for this reason that there is little particularly distinctive about 
contemporary sociological research methods. There is, for example, a plethora of social 
research methods texts and a dearth of texts devoted specifically to sociological research 
methods. Thus to assess what sociological method can contribute to sports history, and 
notwithstanding a personal advocacy of historical or developmental sociology, it is useful to 
return to a conception of sociology’s distinctive intellectual mission vis-à-vis Durkheim. In 
what follows I present one specific and one more generic consideration. First, I comment on 
the increasing use of interview data in historical analyses of sport. Second, I develop that 
point by highlighting the importance of comparison and of positioning explanations at a level 
of generality that allows us to explore the broader character of social systems. 
The use of interviewing in historical studies is to be welcomed for it contributes to the 
rejection of the somewhat false dichotomy of past and present which has divided sociology 
and history.11 But if one compares the interview data that sociologists and historians present, 
a distinct difference is immediately apparent. Specifically, historians frequently directly 
attribute quotes to named individuals and have not adopted the conventions of anonymity and 
confidentiality. Why should this be?  
There are ethical, practical but also broader conceptual implications of this practice. As 
outlined in the ethical guidelines of the British Sociological Association, the safeguarding of 
research subjects’ privacy is fundamental.12 The rationale for this is that if we can protect 
their identity, interviewees are more likely to honestly and fully divulge information. It 
therefore also has a strongly practical element to it – i.e. it improves the reliability and 
validity of data. Most would argue that there can and should be exceptions to preserving 
anonymity, but those exceptions should be justified on a case-by-case basis and the practice 
should ‘not … discarded lightly’.13 Failing to offer interviewees the option of anonymity is 
problematic as it might restrict the kind and depth of information they are prepared to divulge. 
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Underpinning differences in presenting interview data are divergent conceptual views. 
One reason for citing the names of interviewees seems to be the desire to give the 
individual’s perspective a ring of authenticity – they were there, so they know. But providing 
names also seems to represent a continuation of the propensity in history to privilege 
accounts of individuals. In so doing, it needlessly focuses attention on relatively insignificant 
information, and concomitantly detracts from asking more expansive questions about social 
structure. We should not treat interview data as though it ‘speaks for itself’. We ‘cannot rely 
on naive readings of interview data … we must not take at face value insiders’ explicit 
rationales for action’.14 Rather (and I recognize that this runs counter to the recent popularity 
of auto-ethnography) the words of interviewees are of value because they are indicative of a 
broader body of (theory and) interview data. We need to subject interviewees’ accounts to 
systematic and comparative analysis if we are to avoid reducing the social to the individual.15 
Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method urged us to understand such agency 
perspectives in relation to their interdependence with broader structural dynamics of social 
change. While historians should consider the general applicability of social science interview 
data analysis techniques, the broader issue of orientation and scope is equally important.  
The differences between sociological and historical uses of interview data are also 
reminiscent of Durkheim’s emphasis on comparison. Of course, comparison is not the 
preserve of the sociologist - indeed ‘sports historians are forever making comparisons’16  - 
but just like their respective uses of interview data, we can see that historians and sociologists 
tend to use comparison in different ways. For while Booth argues that ‘comparisons help 
historians understand the nature of sport, its different functions and meanings, the diversity of 
factors that shape sport and influence participation, and how individuals and groups make 
sense of sport and use it for their own ends’,17 comparison for (Durkheimian) sociologists is a 
tool for making more wide-ranging claims about the structural characteristics of particular 
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societies. In other words, my reading of sports history is that comparisons are commonly 
drawn to highlight the specificity of a particular phenomenon upon which an individual 
historian has gathered primary data, while sociologists are more likely to subject cognate 
studies to comparison in order to construct explanations which extend beyond the scope of 
any single study. 
By way of illustration consider my earlier work on the development of cricket in 
American.18 This study relies, pace Durkheim, on both inter- and intra-societal comparison. 
1) Inter-societal comparison enables the debunking of existing theses of the ‘demise’ of 
cricket in America. Firstly, comparison highlights anomalies in explanations based on 
notions of limited ‘sports space’ (i.e. baseball replaced cricket because there was 
insufficient ‘sports space’ for the two to co-exist). Comparison of studies which 
employ this concept shows variable ‘amounts’ of sports space which in turn suggests 
that these estimations are either somewhat arbitrary or teleological. Secondly, inter-
societal comparison problematizes the supposed disjuncture between the properties of 
cricket and national character, for it is difficult to accept that the different ‘national 
characters’ of India, South Africa, Australia and England are equally conducive to the 
game’s uptake, while those of Scotland, Ireland and America are equally averse. 
2) Intra-societal comparison shows first that rule changes did not necessarily make 
baseball more American in character (i.e. faster and shorter) or more distinct from 
cricket (e.g. abolition of catching ‘on the fly’). Second, a comparison of historical 
studies of cricket in various American regions, shows the geographically 
heteronomous diffusion of cricket in America; that is to say, developed by different 
classes in different places, in the context of varying configurations of social class 
relations and thus with different outcomes. 
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3) Inter-societal comparison of the different social class and economic relations in 
American and English cricket in the nineteenth century exposes the broader social 
structural dynamics behind cricket’s demise. In particular, the context of 
commercialization, amateur-professional relations and debates over what constituted 
legitimate bowling techniques, indicate that the game being diffused ‘from’ England 
was not of a unitary nature. Moreover, it helps explain why Harry Wright, a 
professional employed by the St George’s Cricket Club in New York, should consider 
the formation of the first professional baseball team (the Cincinnati Red Stockings) 
more commercially viable than founding a professional cricket team. 
 
I am not saying that historians do not, or cannot, undertake the kind of comparative 
approach advocated here. Similarly I am not saying that history does not or cannot ask the 
‘bigger’, structural questions about collective representations and the dynamics of social 
development which Durkheim envisaged as sociology’s distinctive mission. Indeed, to turn 
that position on its head, sociology cannot address these types of question without an 
inherently historical orientation. But the implication of this example is to question whether 
the collection of primary data from archives is the only profitable mode of (historical) 
analysis.  
Rather, I would argue that the production of more adequate knowledge about our social 
world requires cooperation across disciplines (and generations). As it is impossible for any 
individual to undertake all the primary data gathering required for the kind of ‘complete 
systematization of experiences’, cross-fertilization of studies is a necessity. Our goal should 
be the synthesis of understanding of higher and lower levels of generality and fundamental to 
this is the extensive use of comparison. 
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